Using the Audit Manager

Guidelines for effective system auditing

The administration of the audit subsystem is the key to effective auditing. Through careful setup and use of the audit subsystem, you have a powerful tool that helps keep the system trusted and identify problems when they do arise. The subsystem is designed to be very complete in terms of audit event coverage both from kernel actions and from the use of system utilities. It is also designed for reliability and to minimize the impact on the performance of the system as a whole.

You should follow certain guidelines when using the audit subsystem. The subsystem is designed to offer flexible performance and reliability and to let you collect the audit data that you want. Audit record generation supports ``preselection'' of audit events, user IDs, and group IDs. Preselection is valuable if you want to concentrate on a specific user or group of users for some reason (for example, when particular users have a pattern of attempting access to files to which they are not permitted). Event types may also be used for preselection such as auditing only login and logoff events. Preselection also saves disk space because the amount of audit records written to the collection files by the subsystem is reduced. There is, however, a drawback to using preselection. If a system security violation occurred and that event or the user that perpetrated the event was not selected for audit, the action is not recorded.

For this reason, it is more conservative to not preselect the audit events and users or groups, but instead to perform full auditing so that all security-related events are recorded in the audit trail. The disadvantage of full auditing is that it consumes a great deal of disk space.

How well the subsystem meets your goals depends on proper administration of the system. You control the tradeoff between reliability and performance using audit parameters. Improper setup can result in poor performance, loss of audit data, or both. For example, setting the audit event mask to govern event types audited by the subsystem is critical. If event preselection does not include login events, a penetration of the system through a dial-up line might go undetected. Therefore, it is vital that you carefully consider performance, reliability, and security goals.

Performance goals

When estimating the impact of the audit subsystem on the performance of the system, it is important to consider the actions that must be performed by the subsystem. The audit subsystem device driver is the focal point for the collection of audit records from all sources and is responsible for writing those records to the audit trail. The driver writes to a collection file that is shared by all processes being audited in the system. This situation is similar to an airline reservation system with multiple clerks are accessing a common database. Lockout mechanisms must exist to prevent the intermixing of audit records and to insure the consistency of the database. The same is true of the audit subsystem collection files.

An internal buffering mechanism and a write-behind strategy tries to minimize the impact of multiple, simultaneous writers to the collection file. This lets the subsystem service audit records from processes and applications while collection files are being written in parallel. You can tune this mechanism for how much buffering is used and how frequently data is written to the collection file.

Reliability goals

Equally important to the system's performance is the reliability of the audit trail produced. Traditional UNIX systems lack the element of preserving filesystem integrity when a system crash occurs. This stems from the fact that I/O is accomplished using a pool of buffers that are (mostly) written asynchronously. Thus, changes made to files may not actually be recorded on disk at the time of a system crash.

This is unfortunate because the events leading up to a system crash are the ones that are most interesting from an audit standpoint. It is highly desirable to minimize any potential data loss from the audit subsystem as the result of a system crash. To meet this objective, the audit subsystem uses a facility called synchronous I/O that causes audit collection buffers and collection file inodes to be updated immediately as they change. This minimizes the potential amount of data that could be lost as the result of a system crash.

There is a direct correlation between the degree of data reliability and the performance of the audit subsystem. Audit records that are generated by the kernel audit mechanism, trusted applications, and protected subsystems are typically 40 to 60 bytes in length. If each record is written to the disk synchronously as it is presented to the subsystem, the result is poor performance; the I/O system gets flooded because of the high rate at which these records are generated. The solution is to buffer the records and write them together to the audit trail at selective intervals. These intervals can be determined by elapsed time or an accumulated data threshold. Again, the choice is yours.

Security goals

The final area critical to audit subsystem administration is determining what needs to be audited. Preselection options for record generation can be used to fine tune the audit trail to concentrate on an event or several events. For example, the system may be limited in use to a small group of people but left unattended at night. Several dial-in lines may be provided for after-hours work. You may only be concerned with accounting for who uses the system and when. In this case, preselection can be used only to audit login and logoff events. Attempts to penetrate the system by unauthorized users would then be audited as unsuccessful login attempts.

Audit may also be focused on specific users or groups of users. This lets you concentrate on suspected violators of security policies. The less auditing that is requested, the less impact the subsystem has on the system performance.

Full auditing creates an extensive and detailed record of system events, but also requires the most resources to accomplish. It is often better to have recorded the events and to use the reduction tools to discard unwanted records later than not to have the records that are really needed to examine a problem. This decision depends on the degree of security you wish to achieve.

It is important to understand the definition of an audit session with respect to the subsystem. A session is intended to correspond to an interval from the time the system is booted until the system is taken down. To reduce the amount of data written to the audit trail, the audit subsystem was designed to minimize the size of each audit record. Consequently, the state of a process is defined by a sequence of audit records rather than being indicated completely in each record. The space and time savings of this approach are tremendous but require that careful administration be used to avoid pitfalls.

WARNING: If the audit subsystem is disabled while the system is running and later re-enabled, a new session is created. Some processes that are audited in the second or subsequent session might have been created during the first session. Consequently, a session may not contain all of the relevant process state needed for a certain process. In turn, this can lead to incomplete record reduction. You can avoid this problem by disabling auditing only by taking the system down. Refer to ``Maintaining audit trail continuity'' for more information.

Administrative concerns

There are several areas of concern for the audit administrator:

Disk space
The audit subsystem can generate a large number of audit records. Even though the records are fairly small, the storage required to maintain them can grow quite large. As a consequence, care must be exercised in administering the system. Auditing should be directed to disks that have a good deal of space available. The subsystem has built-in protection mechanisms that warn when the audit device is getting low on space. If the situation is not rectified and the amount of disk space remaining goes below a certain threshold, the subsystem attempts to switch to a new audit directory. For this reason, alternate audit directories should be placed on different filesystems. Whenever the subsystem encounters an I/O error, it attempts to audit to a new directory in the list.

System failures
Most systems crash at some time. If a system crash occurs, there is potential for data loss in the audit trail due to buffered output records and inode inconsistencies. The audit subsystem makes every attempt to use synchronous I/O for critical operations like buffer, inode, and directory flushing, but this does not guarantee that data always makes it to the disk, especially if a disk failure caused the system crash.

It is not uncommon to find filesystem damage on audit trail files upon reboot. You may have no choice but to remove the audit files to clear up the problem. This compromises the audit trail somewhat, but should pose no problem for recovering the filesystem from whatever damage occurred.

Subsystem messages
The audit subsystem is resilient. I/O errors are handled by the subsystem by attempting to switch collection or compaction to a new directory. The same is true of recovery in cases where filesystem free space gets too low. There are situations where the subsystem may be unable to continue. If the disk media is corrupted or there is no filesystem space remaining, the subsystem terminates and prints a message to that effect on the system console. Any abnormal termination condition results in a console message that should help you determine the problem.

In the case of system problems in general, the symptoms are not generally limited to audit alone. One problem that can occur upon removal and subsequent re-creation of the audit parameter file relates to duplicate session-building. Each time auditing is enabled, a new session is created. The session is defined by the log file and all of the compacted files generated during the audit period. The files are uniquely stamped with the session number for easy identification and use by subsystem utilities that need access to the files; the utilities may deal with session numbers rather than filenames.

If sessions are allowed to remain on the machine and the parameter file is modified such that the subsystem session number is reset, the result may be an attempt to create an audit file using the same name as a previous session. If this occurs, the old sessions should be archived and removed using the Files selection of the Audit Manager before auditing is reenabled.

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© 2003 Caldera International, Inc. All rights reserved.
SCO OpenServer Release 5.0.7 -- 11 February 2003